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Explaining the Implementation of
CEDAW: A Quantitative Study of
151 Countries
Jessica Ray

Abstract
The :,phere of women s rights presents a unique challenge to improving the protection of
human rights throughout the world. The difficulty surrounding the implementation olwomen 5'
rights treaties may large~v be attributed to the complexity of reconstructing international
norms so that they jail in line with current local norms that perpetuate women s derogatory
status. My quantitative stU((v of 151 countries shows that "dissonant" states (i.e., states
whose local views and treatment olwomen conflict with international norms) are less likely to
implement the Convention on the Elimination ojAll Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW). Polic),makers need to look jiJr other ways, in addition to international treaties,
if they want to improve the status of lVomen in these states. Statistical analysis also shows
a strong correlation between economic development and CEDAWs implementation. Future
research can strive jiJr more valid measures of local actors and NCOs, bringing us closer to
understanding how to improve the lives of women.
Introduction
Within the past fifty years, the international human rights campaign has grown significantly,
both in the number of its participants and in the contextual breadth of its declarations. However,
scholars still debate if international human rights norms actually lead to greater women's rights
protection. The forefront of their disagreement is the implementation of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). CEDAW holds a secular,
Western view of women, which comes into direct conflict with more religious, non-Western
views of women. Because of this contention surrounding international women's rights norms,
states face ever-increasing challenges as they proceed to interpret and implement them.
Previous research shows that CEDAW's ratification has led to improved outcomes for
women, but the progress has been slow and varies from state to state (Gray, Kittilson, and
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Sandholtz 2006). If states arc willing to ratify treaties on the rights of women, what factors
prevent them from implcmenting those treaties at the same rate') Furthermore. do international
women's rights treaties improve women's rights in states where domestic norms do not coincide
with international ideals? If not, can culturally and religiously dissonant states reconcile
opposing views without completely adapting to Western, secular views of women 's rights? In
answering these questions, I hypothesize that I) states whose local norms are dissonant with
international norms arc less likely to implement CEDAW. and 2) local factors have a greater
impact than international factors on the implementation of CEDAW in states with dissonant
local norms.
In studying the implementation of human rights norms, CEDAW is an important case
study for two reasons. First, women's rights are diffieult to implement. No region in the world
provides women the same legal, social, and economic rights as men (Weiss 2003, 582). By
studying the most difficult type of human rights implementation. it will be easier to apply
the findings to other realms of human rights treaties. Second. improving the lives of women
improves society in general. If a woman is physically, cmotionally. and economically secure.
she will positively impact her family and her community. For example. educating the young
women of a country will improve the mortality rate. decrease the fertility rates. and positively
impact the health and education prospects for the next generation (World Bank 2004). Finding
what factors influence CEDAW's implementation potentially has worldwide effects.
The convention requires that all states' parties review their existing laws on women. change
laws that discriminate against women, and submit periodic reports to the convention's committee.
Article 3 of the treaty best summarizes CEDAW's fundamental nature:
States Parties shall take in all fields. in particular in the political. social. economic
and cultural fields. all appropriate measures. including legislation. to ensure the full
development and advancement of women. for the purpose of guaranteeing them the
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality
with men (United Nations 1981).
Although some treaty provisions conflict with widely held views of women and their
roles, especially in the Muslim world, treaty ratification has come rather easily. International
pressure led more than 90 percent of the UN's membership to ratify the treaty. As the global
women's movement strengthened toward the end of the twentieth century. international
norms demanded that states improve the condition of women (Weiss 2003, 582). Western
governments and international donors began to tie development assistance to human rights
records and were rcluctant to support states who did not commit to improving the treatment
ofwomcn. Ratification proved to be a valuable public relations move, keeping the state from
bcing a targct of international shame (Weiss 2003,583).
However, CEDAW's ratification not only requires that states align thcir domestic laws
with the provisions of the convention; it also compcls states to fully realize those treaty
provisions by implementing practical measures for womcn to access thc opportunitics. The
implementation stage is the most difficult. espccially whcn a state's local ideas, culture. and
religion do not necessarily support CEDAW's provisions, such as predominately Muslim
statcs. The most heavily debated issue is that of equality versus equity (Weiss 2003, 585). In
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many countries, equality refers to a Western concept in which men and women ought to have
the same treatment. Many other societies, however, believe that the distribution of power,
resources, and opportunities between men and women need only be equitable. For example,
one of the most controversial topics during the 1993 Vienna Human Rights Conference was
the debate over inheritance laws. Westerners argued for a resolution that would ensure equal
inheritance rights for sons and daughters, but representatives from other countries argued that
although inheritance specifically went to the son in their state, there were support mechanisms
built into society that provided benefits not measurable in terms of currency or land to the
daughter (Weiss 2003,585). The law was equitable but not equal. The debate about which value
is superior is the basis for the secular and religious divide that continues to hinder CEDAW's
implementation. Although nearly all UN member countries have ratified a universal treaty on
women's rights, each individual state must frame CEDAW's ideals in a way that is harmonious
with local religious and traditional values.

Theoretical Beginnings: Analyzing the Normative Discourse
Although current discourse on human rights norm formation and implementation offers
great insight into how international organizations create women's rights norms, it cannot fully
explain the variation in implementation because it fails to consider other factors that are unique
to women's rights. By recognizing the inherent differences between general human rights and
women's rights, theorists can more accurately explain why states ratify CEDAW, how and where
implementation occurs, and what factors could improve the global protection of women.
The process of CEDAW ratification-not implementation-is similar to the norm
emergence process described by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). The authors illustrated a
three-stage process of norm emergence, norm cascade, and norm internalization. The first stage
explains that norms emerge when norm entrepreneurs persuade the international community
to accept a moral notion of appropriate or desirable behavior. Norm entrepreneurs must gain
the acceptance of key actors by competing against the existing constellation of norms in
order to reach the tipping point. At this point, usually one-third of states have accepted the
norm, and the second stage of norm cascade begins. In this stage, socialization takes root,
and states and transnational networks use peer pressure to bring other states into concurrence.
Finally, after the norm has become automatic, norm internalization begins: the norm becomes
natural, and advocates press for universal codification. Following this pattern, women's
rights advocates brought women's issues to the international stage, convincing the world of
their moral importance. More and more states committed to improving the status of women,
and eventually the norm was established in international treaties and declarations such as
CEDAW. States ratified the treaty as a way to conform to the international system, legitimize
their presence, and avoid shame. CEDAW's ratification clearly follows existing theories on
international pressure and global integration.
Unfortunately, the norm emergence process cannot explain why some states proceed to
implement the treaty successfully and others do not. The work of Risse and Sikkink (1999)
tried to explain how ideational forces improve states' human rights practices. They argued
that transnational advocacy networks, made up of local and international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), internationals organizations (lOs), and other states, aim to pressure
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states into implementing human rights norms. In the first phase. transnational actors target an
oppressive state by gathering information on its human rights practices and placing it on the
international agenda. After distributing information on human rights abuses. the transnational
actors persuade states to condemn the practices of the target state. In the second phase. the
target state responds by denying the charges and campaigning for domestic support. The third
phase begins as states pressure the target state into compliance by threatening the retraction of
economic and military aid and membership in the international community. At this point. the
state either concedes to the pressure and improves its practices. or it increases the oppression
of its people, thereby increasing domestic opposition and opening opportunities for regime
change. If the state concedes to the intcrnational pressurc and begins fo comply with and
validate human rights norms, it has entered the fourth stage. Once on this path. the state
eventually exhibits rule-consistent behavior, or the fifth stage ofthc spiral model.
Although these models effectivcly show how norm diffusion and socialization affect
human rights protection in oppressive statcs, they have a few weaknesses worth noting. First,
ncither adequately explains the process of norm internalization. Both approaches disregard the
effects of domestic political battles associated with treaty implementation and downplay
the extent to which the continued conversation between collective norms and local practices
redefines and alters the original norm, especially in the realm of women's rights (Zwingel
2005; van Kersbergen and Verbeck 2007).
The 1995 World Conference on Women well illustrates the controversial nature of
women's rights. Prior to this meeting, states reached a consensus on the reproductive and health
rights of women at the Conference on Population and Development in 1994. However. there
were extreme opponents to the consensus, including the Vatican and various Islamic states.
The 1995 meeting provided a forum in which opposing groups could express their viewpoints
on how to implement women's rights (Joachim 2003, 268; van Kersbergen and Verbeck 2007.
236). Risse and Sikkink focused on a one-dimensional view of how human rights nonns affect
thc identity and interests of states. However, states can have a more dynamic view of human
rights norms and their diffusion and implementation.
Additionally, the sphere of women's human rights norms prcsents different challenges
than human rights in general. Compared to an oppressive state torturing its citizens or refusing
freedom of the press, violations of women's human rights are usually deeply entrenched in
and facilitated by religious and cultural tradition. Oppression of women is usually the result
of a specific paradigm-not an effort to retain power. For example, the division between a
secular vision of women's rights and a religious view ofwomen's rights is highly contestedespccially in states whcrc various religious and cultural groups define marriagc and family
law. Thus far, the international discourse on women's rights has taken a secular and western
viewpoint, giving a hegemonic bias to international norm crcation that previous studies have
not addressed.
Even though Rissc and Sikkink offered a persuasive explanation of general human rights
implementation, they did not fully explain the variation in implemcntation ofwomen's human
rights. One variable that the authors ignored was how socialization influences implementation
of women's rights. States have different circles of influence. They care more about gaining
acceptance from friends than enemies-even when the enemy is the entire international
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system. Even though the international trend is to accept the norm, a regional trend to reject the
norm in the name of culture or religion may be more persuasive. When theorists consider these
factors, the explanation of women's rights norms and implementation is more accurate.
By connecting the theoretical progress of Risse and Sikkink with the separate factors of
women's rights, Susanne Zwingel presented a fuller explanation of women's rights and norm
implementation (2005). She argued that CEDAW's domestic implementation depends on three
factors: I) the degree to which domcstic institutions enable women to participate in public
policy formation, 2) the existcnce of transnational government and nongovernment action that
supports the implementation of international norms, and 3) the level of cultural acceptance
of the convention (408). With these three factors, Zwingel showed how implementation of
women's rights relies more heavily on domcstic factors than Risse and Sikkink's model.
An empirical test of Zwingel's explanation of women's rights norms leads to important
implications for women's rights.

Empirical Explanations
Authors Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz posed the question, "How do rising levels of
international interconnectedness affect the social, economic, and political conditions for
women?" (2006, 293). Their subsequent study hypothesized that cross-national exchange
improves the status of women. By analyzing both economic and ideational effects on
international interaction, the authors performed a quantitative study of 180 countries from
1975-2000, measuring the impact of globalization on women's life expectancy, literacy,
economic participation, and parliamentary participation. This study helps determine which
theories best explain CEDAW's implementation and where improvements may be made.
The authors tested whether "countries that are predisposed (for internal reasons) to
promote equality for women will both ratify CEDAW and show more favorable outcomes on
the dependent variables" (322). They found that high trade levels and CEDAW ratification
without reservations had a positive effect on female life expectancy and literacy. And
although CEDAW ratification did not affect the number of women serving in parliament
among democracies, it did correlate with a greater female percentage in the labor force and
parliament in non-democracies-even when CEDAW was passed with reservations. These
results refute the notion that ratification and positive levels of women's equality were both
products of underlying factors (326). However, test results did show that religion played a
major part in both CEDAW's ratification and levels of illiteracy among women. For example,
predominately CathDlic countries had lower levels of female illiteracy and were more likely
to ratify CEDAW, whereas predominately Islamic countries had higher levels of illiteracy and
were far less likely to ratify CEDAW. The authors concluded that participation in international
organizations and treaties can change institutions, which in tum may alter culture in favor of
protecting women's rights.
However, the authors' connection between international institutions and cultural change
was weak. Their study did not account for the possibility of transnational interaction in the
form of nongovernmental organizations. As argued by Zwingel, transnational government and
nongovernment activism may affect the protection of women's rights. This effect cannot be
measured by trade, foreign direct investment, membership in the UN and the World Bank,
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or ratification of CEDAW (all the global interaction variables). Furthermore, the study
assumed that domestic and international women's groups and organizations are empowered
by the diffusion of gender equality norms initiated by international treaties and declarations.
However, there is a possibility that the actual relationship between women's movements
and international discourse is reciprocal in nature-both entities continue to influence and
strengthen one another. Again, the study did not test for this possibility, and the question of
NGO influence remains unanswered.
Moreover, the failure to account for variables of international interaction could explain
why the authors did not show that certain states are predisposed to both better gender equality
and treaty ratification. The article's theoretical discoursc concluded that states that are
"more open to the international system in terms of greater movement of goods and services
across borders" (3 17) are more likely to support women's rights. However, economic factors
also influence the level to which states interact ideationally in the intcrnational system:
not only do goods and services cross borders, but so do ideas-especially in the form of
international nongovernmental organizations. Although Gray. Kittilson, and Sandholtz
(2006) showed that CEDAW's ratification is an important factor in the improvement of
women's rights, their study did not illustrate the importance of transnational interaction
specific to women's rights or the level to which diffcrent states valuc that interaction. We
must ask how international women's rights norms can be reconciled with culturally or
religiously dissonant communities.

The Importance of Local Factors in Dissonant States
The previous studies portrayed implementation as complete acceptance or complete
rejection of the international human rights norm. However. Acharya proposed a different view
of implementation that included local agents framing and reconstructing foreign norms to
ensure that norms fit with the local identity and culture (2004). Even though international
actors may "teach" women's rights norms to states, the reception of the norm depends on
domestic political, religious, and cultural factors (2004, 243). In this process of reconstructing
the international norm to make it congruent with local norms, the role of local actors is more
important than the role of outside actors (2004, 244).
In relation to CEDAW's implementation, it is likely that both international and local
factors affect implementation at the domestic level. However, it is also possible that one factor
becomes more influential in certain cases. I hypothesizc that local factors havc a greater impact
than international factors in states where local norms and values concerning women dispute
the international norms outlined by the convention. In a state where the domestic values
concerning the status of women contradict CEDAW's international values, the state will face
strong domestic opposition from political, cultural, and religious leaders who do not want to
change the current way oflife. They strongly reject change bccause it has far-reaching cultural,
social, political, and economic effects. Anti- Wcstcrn sentiments and opposition intensify
because they see CEDAW as a secular document. Therefore, the voices of transnational actors
will be less effective, and possibly harmful, because the state sees CEDAW as imposing a
Western ideal on a non-Western culture and because the actors will be less qualified to frame
the ideal in a way that does not contest domestic culture. However, local factors in the form
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of women's political empowerment and domestic women's groups can frame and reconstruct
CEDAW's provisions so that they fall in line with national values.
The most important local factors to CEDAW's domestic implementation are the level to
which women are represented in government and economic institutions, the level to which
the government supports and cooperates with grassroots women's rights movements, and the
level of congruence between international norms and local norms. While trying to implement
CEDAW, states could face great barriers such as rigid institutions or deeply rooted cultural
values that oppose the norm. However, if women are represented politically and economically,
there will be more opportunities for advocates to frame or restructure CEDAW's provisions
to fit with local norms. Similarly, if a state supports and encourages domestic groups that
advocate CEDAW's implementation, then more resources will be devoted to their work. Most
importantly, however, if a state's local norms arc easily associated with international norms,
implementation will be easier. On the other hand, the further removed a state's local norms
are from CEDAW's essence, the more difficult it is for local actors to frame the norm in a
harmonious way, and the more important their work becomes.

Case Study of Pakistan
Although the purpose of this research is to show quantitatively that local factors are
more influential in the implementation ofCEDAW in dissonant states, a qualitative example
helps illustrate the challengc of achieving women's rights in Muslim countries. Pakistan's
efforts to implement CEDAW show how the engendering of Muslim civil society poses a
challenge to international norm diffusion (Weiss 2003, 581 ).
Pakistan's current legal structure, a result of Zia ul-Haq's 1979 Islamization program,
places women in an unequal position to men (583). According to the WomanStats multivariate
scale measuring CEDAW's implementation, there is virtually no enforcement of laws
consonant with CEDAW in Pakistan, or such laws do not exist (WomanStats 2007). Pakistan's
report to CEDAW's commission states that, unfortunately, laws and customs derogatory to
women are "justified in the name of Islam or have been introduced as Islamic laws when
clearly they arc retrograde customs and traditions, or ill-informed interpretations that bear no
relation to the divine design" (Weiss 2003, 587). Although Pakistan ratified CEDAW in 1996,
it warned that its adherence to the convention depcnded on the provisions in its constitution.
Simply ratifying CEDAW did not mean instant success for Pakistani women.
Today, Pakistan is struggling to construct culturally acceptable definitions of women's
rights and appropriate ways to implement them bccause it does not have and does not allow
an active local network to reconstruct thc norm. Although some elite women hold a presence
in Pakistani politics, women have generally been excluded from the political process. Longstanding traditional beliefs define women's roles within the home, and the proliferation of
religious schools exclude women from the public sphere, as well, denying them any source
of education or personal income. Additionally, various grassroots women's rights groups that
strive to raise the issues of domestic violence, women's political participation, and female
education are severely limited by the state. The central government "warns them not to
push it too far so as not to anger the various Islamist madras as now aspiring to have greater
influence over Islamic laws" (593). All three of the most important local factors contributing
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to CEDAW's succcssful implementation arc missing in Pakistan, illustrating the importance
of local factors in dissonant states.

Data Collection
Although Pakistan offers a poignant example of implcmentation in dissonant states,
a large-n, quantitative study was helpful in discovering what factors arc most influential in
causing states to implement CEDA W. By studying as many countrics as possible, I observed
maximum variation in both my independent and dependent variables and effectively controlled
for other factors contributing to CEDAW's implementation. This makes my findings more
generalizable and helps me avoid the selection bias inherent in qualitative case studies. I
limited my study to countries whose total population is over one million, which allowed me to
include lSI countries in my samplc. Because data concerning thc status of women, especially
in developing countries, is so difficult to gather, I chose to confine my study to data collected
between 2000 and 2006. Although the information docs not come from the same year, the
range is small enough that valid comparisons may be made.
In testing my hypothesis that local actors havc a greater impact on CEDAW's
implementation in dissonant statcs, I collected data about the variation in states' local norms
concerning the status of women. A dissonant state exhibited significant formal reservations to
CEDAW and limited the discussion of gender issues within society. I expected to see that the
overwhelmingly majority of states that are culturally dissonant to international women's rights
norms were Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist. It is important to note that most religious norms that
harm women are not necessarily due to the religion itself; howevcr, religious interpretation and
cultural practices associated with these three rcligions may condone gender inequalities. For
example, every Muslim country that has ratificd the treaty has stated that certain provisions of
the convention may be contradictory to tenets of Islam (Weiss 2003, 584). To test local norms
in my statistical analysis, I have chosen to opcrationalize dissonant statcs as countries in which
the majority of the population is Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist majorities. I found the religious
breakdown of each country using the Central Intclligence Agency's World Facthook (2007).
Religion is an overarching predictor of cultural and societal values, and, therefore, a valid
measure of the level to which a state's local norms are congruent with intcrnational norms.
Ifmy hypothesis is correct, states that are both dissonant and successful in implementing
CEDAW when all else is held constant should show several commonalities. First, NGOs
focused on women within the country will be largely domestic: grassroots level organizations
as opposed to organizations outside the state. If NGOs act more as international actors, then
their efforts will be less effective in a statc that does not value the international norm. Second,
within a dissonant state that exhibits a higher level of implementation, womcn will readily
participate in the political and economic arenas and partake in thc decision-making processes
of both. If the analysis demonstrates thesc implications, it would show that local factors are
more influential in dissonant states.
Regrettably, both of these implications proved difficult to measurc with thc time and
rcsources available. Ideally, I collected data measuring the level to which a statc's NGOs
were grassroots level organizations as opposed to international organizations; however, this
information was difficult to collect, and I could not find a comparable substitute. In addition,
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I hypothesized that intemationaI factors such as the lcvel to which a state values global
integration and the prcsence of intemational nongovemmental organizations (INGOs) within
the state should show no correlation with implementation levels in dissonant states. Because
local factors are the key to framing and reconstructing the intemational norm in a culturally
accepting way, these intemational factors do not affect CEDAW's implementation.
To test the effect of intemational factors on CEDAW implementation in dissonant states, I
operationalized global integration by measuring the amount of time a state has been a member
of the UN and the World Bank and measured its trade level. These measures are modeled
from a study by Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz. They theorized that the longer a eountry has
been a member of these intemational organizations, the more likely they are to absorb the
intemational women's rights norms promulgated by each organization (2006, 309). Gray,
Kittilson, and Sandholtz operationalized global integration by measuring the level to which
a country trades with others, with high levcls of trade implying that the country has more
investment in and interaction with the intemational system-and the women's rights norms
associated with it.
Lastly, I measured the number of INGOs present in each state. Because I could not test
whether local NGOs affect implementation, it was especially important to find evidence that
intemational actors do not affect implementation in dissonant states.
In terms of my second implication, women's political and economic decision-making
power, the UN's Human Development Report's Gender Empowerment Measure indexes the
inequality between men's and women's political and economic opportunities. This information
was available for eighty-four countries. For the other countries in my sample, I measured the
percentage of women in govemment at the ministerial level. Although this does not specifically
represent the level to which women have decision-making power in the political and economic
realms, I can assume that the more women there are in govemment, the more women there are
that have decision-making power overall.
It is important to note that there are several other factors that contribute to the status
of women around the world. For example, I assumed that lesser developed countries would
have fewer protections for women's rights due to the nature of poverty and the resources
available to the state. Additionally, regime type has been shown to affeet the protection
of human rights. I also expected that more populous countries would have a harder time
controlling human rights practices and that countries in the midst of conflict are subject to an
increase in human rights abuses. Therefore, I have included control variables for economic
development, regime type, size of country, and conflict. These controls are based on those
used by Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz (2006) and Landman (2005). These controls, along
with the rest of the variables, are outlined in Table I.
Defining Implementation of CEDAW
Within the context of my research, I defined CEDAW's implementation as the level to
which a state's laws are consistent with CEDAW, if those laws are enforced, and how much
the govemment prioritizes enforcement. To measure implementation, I used the Scale of the
Degree of Discrepancy between Law and Practice on Issues Conceming Women in Society
(WomanStats Codebook 2007). The scale examines three sub-clusters, including physical
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Dependent Variable
Level to which a state's laws and
WomanStats Database 2007
practice arc consonant with
continuous scale 0 to 4 with 0 meaning
high implementation and 4 meaning

CEDAW

Implementation

low implementation

Independent Variables
Intemational Actors

UN/World
Bank Years
Trade Ratio

INGOs
Local Actors

Dissonance

Womcn's Political
Participation
Muslim, Hindu, and
Buddhist States

Collective years of membership in the
UN and the World bank
Natural log of a state's total imports
plus total exports divided by GDP
(Gray, Kittilson, and SandholtL 20(6)
Natural log ofthc number oflNGOs
registered in each state
Percentage of women in

World Bank 2007/UN 2007
World Bank 2006

Landman 2005
UN HDR 2007

ministerial positions
States in which the majority of the
population is Muslim, Hindu, or
Buddhist (dichotomous)

CIA World Faetbook 2007

States which were in a civil war

Landman 2005

Cantral Variables
Conflict

in 2000 (dichotomous)
Scale 10 to + I 0
Natural log ofGDP Per Capita in
US dollars
Natural log of population of country

Democracy
Economic Development
Size

Polity IV
CIA World Factbook 2007
World Bank 2006

in thousands

______________
T_ab_l_e_2: Implementation Scale _ _ __
Score

Definition
'The laws are consonant with CEDAW and arc well enforced; such cnforcement is a high priority of the
government."

"The laws are consonant with CEDAW; these are mostly enforced, and the government appears to be
fairly proactive in challenging cultural nonns which harm \vomen."
"Thc laws arc consonant with CEDAW, but therc is spotty enforccmcnt~ the governmcnt mayor may
not signal its intcrest in challenging cultural nonns hannful to women."
"Laws are for the most part consonant with CEDAW, with little effective enforcement; improving the
situation of women appears to bc a low priority for thc government."

"There is virtually no enforcement of laws consonant with CEDAW. or such laws do not evcn exist."
'" All dcnlll\10m. taken from Hudson. el al., 2007

security and bodily integrity, education, and family freedom. The original scale ranges from
zero to four with zero being high implementation; however, for ease in interpreting quantitative
results, I have inversed the scale, and the resulting breakdown is outlined in Table 2.
Because data concerning the status of women is difficult to gather, especially in countries
whose treatment of women falls below the international standard, the validity of some of the
measures within my quantitative analysis is less than ideal. The multivariate scale measuring
the law and practice of each state is missing values for twenty-five countries out of my dataset
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of 150 countries. To compensate for thc missing values, I cntered in values for another, similar
multivariate scalc measuring the discrepancy between law and practice concerning women's
physical security. This measure correlates with the original multivariate scale 70.3 pcrcent of the
time. Although not a pcrfect substitute, using the physical security scale allows me to continue
with the study without having to wait for the compilation of more complete data.

Criteria for Verification
After statistical analysis of the above implications, I will conclude that my theory is
correct only if the data meets the following criteria. First, I will conclude that norm dissonance
negatively affects CEDAW's implementation if I find that the implementation lcvels of
congruent states are 20 pcrcent higher than those of dissonant state. I will only accept this
criteria ifthc difference is statistically significant as wcll. I will conclude that norm congruence
does not atTect implementation if the difference is less than 10 percent or is not statistically
significant at the 0.05 lcvel.
Second, I will conclude that local actors have a greater impact on implementation in
incongruent states ifthc measure of women's political participation, when interacted with the
variables for dissonance, shows at least a 10 percent difference in implementation between
dissonant and congruent states. Similarly, I will only accept this criteria if the variables
prove statistically significant at the 0.05 level. However, if the ditTerence in implementation
atTected by local actors is less than 5 percent, I will conclude that local actors are not any more
influential in implementing CEDA W in dissonant states than in congruent states. Overall, the
variables measuring the effect oflocal factors were most affected by missing data; therefore, I
will be cautious in approaching the results of this statistical analysis.
Third, I will conclude that international factors are no less influential than local factors if
I find that UN/World Bank membership, trade levels, or presence of INGOs show a 10 percent
ditTerence in implementation levels between dissonant and congruent states. If any of these
variables show a 10 percent ditTerence in implementation that is significant at the 0.05 level,
then the data will show that international actors do have an impact in dissonant states and
that my second hypothesis is incorrect. However, if none of the variables show a significant
difference in implementation levels, then the data will show that international actors have no
more influence in implementation than local actors.
If my analysis meets these criteria, I will be confident that there is a correlation between
local actors and CEDAW implementation in incongruent states. However, these measures
will not fully show'that the influence of local actors actually causes greater implementation.
Nevertheless, I feel that correlation in itself will be a significant finding and leave it to future
qualitative research to test the causation between local actors and implementation of women's
rights norms.
Methods and Results
To test my first hypothesis that dissonant states are less likely to implement CEDAW,
I ran a linear regression of all variables to see if there was a significant difference between
dissonant states and congruent states in the level of implementation. The results from this
regression are outlined in Table 3. The regression shows that economic development, as
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Table 3: Implementation ofCEDAW

Table 4: Implementation of CEDAW
with Interaction

Modell

- - - - _. .

.~----

Controls
Polity

Conflict

- - -

Con/rols
Polity

0.0041
(0.0127)

0.5727***
GDP Per Capita (natural log)

(OOX6X)
Population (natural log)

-

Modell

-0.0029
(00123)

GOP Per Capita (natural log)

_.

0.0367
(0.OSI>2)
0.0114

Population (natural log)

0.04X4
(0.05X7)

Conflict

0.0696
(04623)

(0452X)
International Actors
UN/World Bank Years (natural log)

International Actors
UN/World Bank Years (natural log)

0.1105
(0.1366)

Trade Ratio (natural log)

-0.0237
0.OS33

-0.0294
(0.1442)

INC;Os (natural log)

0.1019
(0.OSI4)

(O.06R2)
Local Actors
Women's Political Participation

Local Actors
Women's Political Participation

0.0022
(0.006X)

Dissonance
Muslim. Hindu. Buddhist Majorities

Dissonance
Muslim. lIindu. Buddhist Majorities

0.5197***
(OI64R)

Number a/Observations

Interaction Terms
Dissonance by UN/World Bank Years

137

Ad}llsted_R_'_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0.5076
:-.Jotc: Standard errors in parentheses
*p<o.!: **p ...'O.05: ***p<O.O I

0.0061
(0.1492)

Trade Ratio (natural log)

(0.1251 )
INGOs (natural log)

0.5709*"
(0.OS74)

0.0006
(0.0072)
0.2096
(0.996X)
-O.OOSS'
(0.0052)

Dissonance by Trade Ratio

0.1341
(0 1975)

Dissonance by INGOs

·0.0345
(0.1600)

Dissonance by Women's Political
Paricipatinn

0.0066
(0.0247)

Numher of Obscr\'{lfiol1S

Ad;lIsted R'

137

0507
---------

Note: Standard ("rror~ 111 parentheses
0.1; **p<O.05: "'**p',O.01

"'p~

measured by the natural log of GOP per capita, and the dummy variable for dissonant states
were the two statistically significant variables affecting CEOAW's implementation. These
results show that a state's development level and local norms were the two greatest predictors
of how effectively that statc will implement CEOAW and cxplain nearly 51 percent of the
variance in implementation of CEOAW. The coefficients of each variable were substantively
significant as well. For example, the difference in implementation level between dissonant
states and congruent states was 0.52 points on the 0-4 scale of implementation; in other words.
implemcntation levels of dissonant statcs are about 10 percent lowcr than congruent states.
Although this percentage may be considered low, I conclude that is significant because of the
difficulty in predicting implementation of human rights treaties.
In terms of my second hypothesis, there should be a difference in the significance levels
of the international and local actor variables if local actors are more influential in dissonant
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Economic Development v. Implementation of CEDAW
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Figure I: Economic Development and Implementation of CEDAW

states than in congruent states. I tested for this difference by creating interaction terms that
modeled each of the international actor variables with the dissonance dummy variable. Ifany of
these interaction terms prove to be significant, then there is a difference between that variable's
effect on implementation in dissonant and congruent states. The results of this test show that
the interaction term between UN/World Bank Years and dissonance is statistically significant,
meaning that the effect of a state's total years of membership in the UN and the World Bank
is stronger in dissonant states than in congruent states (See Table 3). The coefficient is also
negative, meaning that membership years more negatively affect implementation in dissonant
states than in congruent states, which supports my hypothesis that international actors are less
effective in dissonant states.
However, the difference is small and therefore not substantively significant. This result
could be due, however, to the validity of my measures. Because I had to adjust my measures to
solve the problem of missing data, my results may not accurately describe the true relationship
between CEDAW 's implementation and international and local actors. However, none of the
international factors showed a significant impact in dissonant states. In sum, I cannot conclude
that either local actors or international actors are more influential in dissonant states than in
congruent states with the available data.
Although the results from this study do not support my second hypothesis, they do
surprisingly show the overwhelming significance of economic development in women's rights
implementation. However, a scatter plot of the relationship between economic development
and CEDAW's implementation (Figure I) shows a potential problem with heteroskedasticity.
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In other words, the graph shows that economic development is a better predictor for highimplementation states than low-implementation states, which means that the coefficient I
found for the effect ofGDP per capita could be problematic. Heteroskedasticity also suggests
that there is another variable that is not accounted for in my model that would explain the
increased variation in implementation.
Conclusion
The sphere ofwomen's rights presents a unique challenge to improving the protection of
human rights throughout the world. The difficulty surrounding the implementation of women's
rights treaties and declarations may largely be attributed to the complexity. of reconstructing
international norms so that they fall in Iine with current local norms that perpetuate the derogatory
status of women in many societies. After completing a quantitative study of 151 countries, the
results support my first hypothesis that dissonant states are less likely to implement CEDAW
but do not support my hypothesis that local actors are more influential in dissonant states. The
results also show a stronger-than-expected relationship between economic development and
CEDAW's implementation. These results are statistically significant but must be interpreted
with the validity of the measures in mind. Even though not all of the variables measured what
I initially intended to measure, I can conclude that there is a significant difference between
dissonant states and congruent states in terms of CEDAW's implementation. This shows that
the two different types of states should be treated differently in efforts to improve the status of
women. Although this research does not show what factors should be focused on in dissonant
states to increase CEDAW's implementation, future research can strive for more valid measures
and incorporate additional explanations that would bring us closer to understanding how to
improve the lives of women.
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